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Abstract:
Voting must respect several criteria to be democratic. In this paper we determine whether electronic 
voting can simultaneously protect secrecy, be transparent, accessible and resistant to intimidation 
and fraud.We consider different types of e-voting ranging from Direct Recording Electronic voting 
systems  to  remote  internet  voting.  We  show  that  there  are  major  contradictions  between  the 
constraints  of  democratic  elections  and  the  possibilities  offered  by  computers.  In  particular, 
electronic voting appears to make massive and invisible fraud possible to achieve by small groups 
of  people  with  the  necessary  skills.  At  present,  it  is  not  a  realistic  possibilility  to  design  an 
electronic application, remote or not, that could cope with the demands of democratic elections. 
Keywords: 
democratic elections, electronic voting, DRE, VVAT, fraud, accessibility, intimidation, vote selling, 
internet remote voting, remote voting.
Introduction
Counting votes is simple, it becomes a huge problem when there are millions of voters. Automation 
of the voting process has a long history. In the USA, where multiple polls are usual, there were 
early  attempts  to  automate  the  casting  and the  counting  process:  automatic  booth  lever  voting 
machines and punched card voting machines appeared in the beginning of the 20th century and 
rapidly spread through the urban centres of the country. Since 1960, several types of electronic 
optical mark sensing scanners have been adapted to count votes. The first electronic voting machine 
which allowed votes to be cast directly without any ballot paper appeared in 1974 (the Video Voter 
system). Lastly, computers were adapted for use in 1982 with the Microvote Electronic Voting 
Computer. 
Electronic voting (or e-voting) is, therefore, a term which refers to various voting processes where 
computers are used to count votes and/or to cast votes. There are now many different models and 
types of electronic voting systems in use in a dozen countries. Some of these countries use them in a 
generalized way. We can cite: Brazil, India, Netherlands, Venezuela and United States of America. 
During this  brief  history,  some countries  have had to  abruptly  revise their  decisions  about  the 
computerization of voting procedures because technical, sociological and ethical problems arose1. 
After twenty-five years of use we can now take stock of these different experiments. 
In  this  article  we  will  describe  several  features  of  e-voting:  transparency,  accessibility,  and 
resistance to intimidation and fraud. After reiterating the definition of genuine elections as defined 
by international organizations, this paper will present a typology of e-voting. Then, it will analyse 
different  electronic  voting systems in  order  to  evaluate  their  compatibility  with several  criteria 
which define democratic elections. Finally we will compare these different electronic systems with 
a  traditional  paper  ballot  system and demonstrate  that  electronic  voting facilitates massive and 
invisible frauds.
1 Electronic voting, first introduced in the Netherlands in the early 1990s and used in 90% of the country, has been 
withdrawn in favor of traditionnal ballot paper and red pencils in October 2007.
1. Genuine elections
1.1 - Basic principles
The basic principles of genuine elections are defined in article 21 of The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (accepted by all the member states of the United Nations):
« The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. » [United Nations 
1948]
This  article  21  describes  some  characteristics  of  genuine  elections:  there  should  be  no 
discrimination of any kind, such as that based on race, colour, sex, religion, etc. (universality) each 
voter may cast only one ballot which is counted as one vote (equality), voting should take place in 
privacy. Most importantly genuine elections should return an accurate result which fairly conveys 
the will of the people. The reliability of the election process must be proved and the election system 
must be observable and observed to give confidence and be regarded as trustworthy.
In this article we will not discuss all the conditions that have to be considered to meet fair elections, 
we will  focus  only on particular  features:  transparency,  which allows confidence,  accessibility, 
which is the right of every voter to vote and we will observe how the system is protected against 
fraud and how it protects voters against intimidation.
1.2 - Transparency for inspiring confidence and ensuring trustworthiness
Confidence in the election system is crucial because this will influence whether the election results 
are accepted.
The election system should provide sufficient evidence to convince the losing candidate that he or 
she actually lost. People who voted for the defeated candidate will only accept the winner if they 
believe the system is fair. In the case of low voter confidence, the elected person's legitimacy could 
be  called  into  question  which  could  potentially  result  in  violent  disturbances  and  political 
instability. If there is to be high confidence in the electoral process, genuine elections are vitally 
important because they enable a peaceful  resolution of the struggle for political  power and are 
therefore, central to the maintenance of peace and stability.
This  confidence  is  based  on  the  premise  that  all  aspects  of  the  elections  process  are  directly 
observable, by the candidates, the official observers and the people themselves. Observations must 
cover  all  the  stages  of  the voting  process:  the pre-election  period  (constitution  of  the  election 
commission membership, registration of candidates, of voters, etc.), the election day, the vote count 
and  the  post-election  period  (announcement  of  the  results,  treatment  of  complaints,  etc.) 
[ODIHR/OSCE 2005].  We will only focus here on a few stages that are affected by electronic 
voting. 
Observations should be consist of practical evidence that is directly related to the voting process 
and which anyone may gather. It must not be limited to a simple examination of the results of the 
voting process because these results may not reflect the voters' intents. Observing a representation 
of the voting process is also unsatisfactory because the representation of the voting process may be 
erroneous. A representation of an object is not the object itself2.
The demonstration that the voting urn is empty at the beginning of polling day is a good example 
which illustrates this fundamental idea. This may be done in several ways. The first possibility 
would be to have a transparent empty urn people can see and touch. Alternatively there could be a 
wooden urn which people could see inside when open, but which they could not touch. A third 
method could consist of a wooden urn which is opened by an official who then confirms the urn’s 
2 This idea is expressed is the well-known Magritte painting representing a pipe and illustrated with the words "Ceci 
n'est pas une pipe" (this is not a pipe). 
emptiness. A fourth situation would be to have a voting computer print a ticket which announces 
that there are no vote in its memory. These four different situations illustrate a successive decline in 
observability  from  the  first  situation,  which  is  a  fully  observable,  to  successively  more 
unsatisfactory ones in which the non-emptiness of the urn could not be detected (in the second case 
the urn could have a  false bottom that  hides ballots,  in the third case people have to trust  the 
official, in the last case, people have to trust the computer program).
Thus, transparency which allows direct observation is a key-concept for genuine elections: it allows 
the  detection  of  structural  defects  and  of  some  threats  to  the  election  process  or  the  voters 
themselves (frauds, intimidation), that could alter the results.
Transparency is a requirement in intergovernmental organizational guidelines for elections.
In its Election Observation Book, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe defines
« A  genuine  election  is  a  political  competition  that  takes  place  in  an  environment 
characterized by confidence, transparency, and accountability and that provides voters with an 
informed choice between distinct political alternatives. » [ODIHR/OSCE 2005]
The European Commission for Democracy through Law emphasizes the necessity for electronic 
voting systems to be transparent. This commission mentions explicitly that free suffrage can be 
achieved only if the right to act to combat electoral fraud is guaranteed and if the voting procedure 
is simple [ComVenice 2002].
In  the  Principles  and  Guidelines  Governing  Democratic  Elections,  the  Southern  African 
Development Community states
« Ensure  the  transparency and  integrity  of  the  entire  electoral  process  by  facilitating  the 
deployment of representatives of political  parties and individual candidates at  polling and 
counting stations and by accrediting national and/other observers/monitors; » [SADC]
In this last guideline we must note that voters themselves are not given the  explicit authority to 
ensure the transparency and integrity of the electoral process yet these issues are major concerns of 
voters in their role as proprietors of sovereignty as is the case in all democracies3. In democracies 
people  entrust  their  representatives,  designated  at  elections,  with  many  executive  powers.  The 
power  to  ensure  the  transparency  and  integrity  of  the  electoral  process  is  not  given  to 
representatives because if this was the case then these representatives would have all executive 
power and the electorate would no longer have any power at all which is contrary to the concept of 
democracy.
 
1.3 - Accessibility
The electoral process must allow the population to vote in privacy without any human assistance, 
including elderly or disabled people or any illiterate person. 
1.4 - Resistance to intimidation and fraud
The electoral process must prevent bribery (“I’ll pay you 15 euros for your vote”)  and coercion 
(“I’ll break your face if you don’t give me your vote”) at the level of individual voters. 
2. Different types of e-voting
2.1 - Direct Recording Electronic - DRE4
Direct Recording Electronic systems are computers. They are placed in the polling stations where 
3 Democracy  literally  means  “rule  by  the  people”.  It  is  derived  from the  ancient  Greek  words  demos  (δημος), 
"people", and kratos (κρατος), “rule”.
4 In French: Ordinateurs de Vote avec Bulletin de vote Dématérialisé (OdV-BD)
the voters usually vote. They are not responsible for identity verification which is required to ensure 
the uniqueness of each vote. The entire process of voting takes place in booths: noting the different 
candidates, choosing, casting the vote. Votes are directly stored and counted by computers, there are 
no paper ballots. At the end of the poll, results can be presented in different formats, depending on 
models and laws.  Printed papers could be issued from voting computers,  or  digital  information 
could be transmitted to the centralization station. Some systems could send the results directly via 
the internet network.
2.2 - Optical scanning systems5
These systems are also placed in usual polling stations. The voters fill  out their ballot paper as 
usual, in a booth. Optical scanning systems are simply used to count votes on ballot papers. This 
may take place throughout the voting day: voters directly cast their vote into the optical scanning 
system of their polling station and the optical scanning system delivers results after the close the 
poll. Alternatively the scanning systems may be used at a later stage: ballots are collected in a urn, 
optical scanning is then done by officials to count the votes after the poll has closed.
2.3 - Voter Verified Audit Trail - VVAT6
This second generation of voting computers appeared around 2002. They are referred to by several 
terms, all of which are equivalent : Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT), but also “Voter Verified 
Paper Audit Trail” (VVPAT) or Voter Verified Paper Records (VVPR).
The main idea is to attach a printer to each DRE system. When a voter chooses a candidate the 
system generates a ballot which the voter can read in order to verify that what is printed is really the 
choice he made. When he confirms his choice the ballot is then collected in an urn [Mercuri 2002b].
2.4 - Voting Kiosk7
Voters can vote in any polling stations. The voting computers are linked to a remote server. Votes 
are registered in the server's memory. 
2.5 - Internet Remote Voting8
Voters can vote  from any computer connected to  the internet.  They will  have been previously 
provided  with  authentication  keys:  login  and  password.  Votes  are  registered  by  the  voting 
application server.
 
2.6 - Non Internet Remote Voting
Experiments have been done with other remote voting systems such as short message service (SMS) 
or digital phone calls.
3. Analysis
3.1 - Transparency
The nature of computers is that their inner workings are secret. Since transactions and calculations 
happen at an electronic level, it is not physically possible for humans to observe exactly what a 
computer is doing [McGaley 2004].
Voting computers are often presented as straightforward computers such as those we are familiar 
5 In French: Ordinateurs de Vote avec Bulletin de vote Matérialisé et Numérisé (OdV-BMN)
6 In French: Ordinateurs de Vote avec Bulletin de vote Matérialisé Vérifié par chaque Électeur (OdV-BMVÉ)
7 In French: Kiosque à Voter
8 In French: Vote à distance par internet
with from everyday use, for example when we withdraw money from a bank automat or when we 
buy a train ticket. In fact there are two very important differences. Firstly, when a withdrawal is 
made from a bank automat the result of this operation is clear – the relevant bank balance will have 
been reduced by a verifiable amount. The results of an election, however, are not known in advance, 
so  it  is  impossible  to  deduce  from the  election  result  whether  a  voting  machine  has  worked 
properly. Second, when purchasing a train ticket, or buying things over the internet, a purchaser will 
know exactly what would happen (goods will be received, and the correct amount of money will be 
debited from client's bank account). We observe that the secrecy of the vote forbids observation of 
the system during the voting period while, in commercial transactions, the identity of buyer and 
seller are known and registered, allowing verifications. 
The impossible prediction of the results and the respect of anonymity are special characteristics of 
voting processes that do not appear with common computerized application.
3.1.1 - Direct Recording Electronic Voting Computers (DRE)
It is impossible to directly verify that the computer registers the votes exactly as they are cast by 
voters. Neither the voters, the officials organizing the votes nor the purchasers really know if a 
voting machine properly registers each vote. 
Tests, whether they are done by experts before or after the vote, are not appropriate procedures with 
which to ensure that the software delivers accurate results and that the computers run smoothly: a 
computer can function properly during tests but may not do so during the real election because of 
bugs or errors.  Even in the more reliable  industries,  such as aerospace,  there  is  no completely 
reliable method known which enables software to be designed and implemented so that computers 
do exactly what they are supposed to [Schneier 1999]. 
« It’s  entirely  possible  that  a  DRE voter  could  vote  for  one  candidate,  which  would  be 
displayed on screen,  while  an entirely  different  candidate  could be recorded internally as 
having received that vote. » [Wallach 2005]
These types of error, which occur in opaque environments, are completely undetectable because 
there is no way to notice them. In addition any failure that affects the recording of the vote or the 
integrity of vote data can cause unrecoverable errors..
DRE voting machines are used by many states like Belgium, France or United States of America. In 
these states a certification procedure is supposed to give the assurance that the voting machines 
conform to  standards,  ignoring  that  today’s  certification  and  “logic  and  accuracy  testing”  are 
completely insufficient to detect such problems. Many scientists claim that the defined standards 
present serious problems and that such certification procedures do not catch the majority of security 
or usability problems [Alexander 2004], [Mulligan 2004], [McGaley 2006], [Barr 2007]. 
Because these machines are not observable, nor auditable, they can not be used with confidence. 
This inherent lack of transparency makes the DRE voting machines inappropriate for democratic 
elections. 
3.1.2 - Optical scan systems and Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT)
With these two voting systems, the production and storage of paper ballots allows ballots to be 
recounted in order to verify the results given by the machines. The ability to perform such a recount 
provides a critical defence against the risk of failures.
We must evaluate whether electronic voting systems which enable the possibility of a recount may 
be considered to be transparent voting systems.
Firstly it should be noted that while the accuracy of these voting systems may be verifiable this does 
not necessarily mean that they will effectively be verified. The major flaw is that they could return a 
result which will instantly become official, even if there is no verification at all or if the verification 
is not properly done.
Secondly, performing a meaningful verification is  a complicated task because it  involves many 
tricky questions that deal with scientific, legislative and social subjects. All of these aspects could 
have a strong influence on the verification procedure.
From a scientific point of view, we must note than even if one machine was shown to function 
correctly, it does not prove that another machine did so too. The idea of verification of a small 
number of the machines to prove that the entire machines are then verified is a non sense. The 
verification  method  itself  is  also  crucial.  The  National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology 
recommended that only "software independent" voting systems be certified. "Software independent" 
systems can be audited without relying on any software for the reliability of the audit [NIST 2006]. 
This recommendation clearly points out that the recount should be done manually, without any 
software. 
Although it is senseless, a random choice of the machines to be tested is made in many countries 
that use VVAT systems. In such a case, the law must say how the machines to be tested are chosen 
because this procedure should be carefully examined to ensure that the choice really is random. This 
procedure should be transparent, and candidates and voters should have the right to ask for the 
testing of additionnal voting computers without being subject to costs. The law must also take in 
account a large amount of details in case of a dispute several days after the poll, for instance, voting 
machines must be kept in secured place forbidden anyone to modify them.
Finally, it will be socially difficult to organize large-scale verification because people will not be 
prepared to repeat a task that had been previously performed by a computer. There is a huge risk 
that people and officials will fail to organize verification after a few successfull polling days show 
test results that indicate no problems occurred. In addition, the commercial arguments will convince 
them that any verification is finally costly and useless.
The worst fault of optical scan and voter verified audit trail systems is that they can deliver results 
even when there is no verification at all. Finally it appears that the addition of ballot printers to 
DRE machines, instead of enhancing transparency, will lead to opacity.
3.1.3 - Remote Voting
Remote voting may be done using different devices (personal computers, phones) that can not be 
fully transparent. Voters can not verify if their vote is correctly stored and counted. 
3.2 - Accessibility
It  is  extremely  difficult  to  design  a  simple  computer-human  interface  which  is  widely 
understandable and which can be used without any assistance. In the overall voter population there 
are elderly, illiterate and disabled people (blind people)9 who may have problems when using voting 
machines. Many of these people may vote with assistance from a third party. This has implications 
regarding privacy and therefore their votes cannot be considered to have been cast freely.
Any voting system should be designed to be ergonomic (user friendly). It would appear that current 
systems were developed without following common guidelines for usability when designing ballot 
forms, did not prevent the appearance of system messages which  may cause alarm  [Laskowski 
2004] and did not properly take into account the possible use of the system by the disabled [Fields 
2003]. 
Accessibility studies are rare because they are costly and difficult to organize for political reasons10. 
Nevertheless  some research has  shown that  e-voting can  affect  election  results  by excluding a 
9 In western countries, around a quarter of the voters are more than 65 years old, in numbers of economically poor 
countries,  many voters,  sometimes  the  majority,  are  illiterate.  The  consequences  of  these  situations  are  rarely 
evaluated. 
10 Accessibilty (and security, costs) have been widely used as commercial arguments. When officials decide to use e-
voting they ususally tend to use the same ideas to convince the people about the new voting system they choose, 
even if there had been no real study on these questions.
Funding accessibility studies would be recognizing that voting machines do not fulfil their promises. 
significant part of the population  [Michel 1999]. Some people may not manage to vote for the 
candidate they intended to. They make mistakes because they are unfamiliar with the screens and 
may misunderstand the actions (like 'validate') they are required to perform. Observations during 
simulations showed that some people failed to vote as they intended and did not notice their error. 
The importance of this phenomenon has not been quantified. 
3.3 - Resistance to intimidation and vote selling
3.3.1 - DRE and Voter Verified Audit Trail
Since the vote takes place entirely in a booth, a voter could film himself in one continuous shot (for 
instance with a mobile phone) from the moment he chooses his candidate until the vote is cast, 
bringing with him a proof of vote. This vote proof can then be exhibited to sell the vote, or may be 
forcibly exhibited in the case of intimidation.
3.3.2 - Optical scanning systems
The  process  described  above  would  be  inappropriate  when  using  an  optical  scanning  systems 
because people cast their votes publicly, outside of the booths: it would be difficult to make a one 
shot film without being noticed. Special equipment like cameras concealed in spectacles would 
allow this kind of film, but it is unusual, rare and may cost several hundred euros.
3.3.3 - Remote Voting
Remote voting, with or without electronics, offers no protection against intimidation or vote selling 
because people vote in an uncontrolled environment. The basic requirements for confidentiality are 
not  guaranteed.  Offering a  possibility  to  re-vote  ([Maaten 2004],  [Van Acker  2004]) is  not  an 
appropriate solution to this problem.
3.4 - Resistance to fraud or errors
Changing the software of a computer changes the behaviour of the computer. So, changing the 
voting software of a voting machine is enough to change how votes will be stored and counted. It is 
easy to conceive of a program that would appear to behave as intended by voters and poll workers 
but that would divert some votes in the favour of a preferred candidate. Voting trends might remain 
unaffected but the preferred candidate would obtain more votes than really were cast by voters, 
which might be enough to win the race. This kind of fraud could be launched by a signal and kept 
dormant the rest of the time. 
To be effective, a fraudulent program must be installed before polling day. Therefore, computers 
must be stored in secure places, secured by several locks whose keys are held by officals and people 
from different  organisations  in  order  to  prevent  any  collusion  to  install  a  fraudulent  program. 
Officials without any special skills in computers sciences may find this requirement difficult to 
understand  because  they  may  tend  to  believe  that  computers  are  inherently  incorruptible11.  In 
addition to this kind of storage being unusual, there is a lack of experience. 
Many demonstrations of fraud have shown that less than five minutes are generally enough to 
replace correctly functioning software with a program that would give fraudulent results [CEV], 
[Kohno 2004].
The  main  problem  is  that  a  fraud  which  attacks  firmware  could  have  huge  consequences  by 
affecting a large number of machines. Achieving this type of fraud demands technical skill and it is 
out of reach of the general population, but could easily be done by well organized people. A few 
people with the necessary skill-set and the opportunity of access to the machines would suffice. For 
example technical staff working for the voting machine’s manufacturer or people with access to the 
machines during transportation or maintenance could install fraudulent software. We must note that 
11 This argument is widely used by the vendors of voting machines.
there would no risk for the fraudsters because their illegal activities would take place before polling 
day.
These security flaws could be used by terrorists or foreign countries to destabilize a nation.
3.4.1 - DRE
With DRE, since there is no physical ballot, it is completely impossible to verify the results of the 
voting  computer  independently  of  the  computer  itself.  By  consequence  detecting  a  fraud  is 
impossible. 
Some parallel tests could be organized. Several computers will be chosen to be tested during the 
whole polling day and will be in use in addition to those actually used for the election. The results 
from the test machines cannot be counted for the election because these tests’ methodology implies 
cast votes are noted down and cannot be secret. At the end of the polling day the results directly 
issued by the tested machine are compared with the votes that had been manually recorded, any 
divergence will be detected, showing whether the tested machines were accurate or not. 
The main problem is that these type of tests are easy to subvert.  It  is possible to automatically 
analyse the voting sequence to detect if it is a real vote sequence or a test. The computer could then 
choose to commit the fraud or not. In addition, parellel testing is completely inefficient in the case 
of a dormant fraudulent program that is activated by an accomplice12 (for instance, it could be a 
voter who knows the secret combination of buttons of the voting machines needed to activate the 
fraudulent program). 
Usually these kind of parallel tests are never organised because officials think that this is useless to 
test voting machines that they purchased because they were told that they had already been tested. 
In addition testing a voting machine during several hours, noting each vote, is complicated and 
prone to error. If there is a small difference between the results of the machine and what has been 
noted by hand, it  would be possible to conclude with good faith that human errors occur when 
recording the votes.
3.4.2 - Optical scan systems and Voter Verified Audit Trail
It is comforting to have a printed paper ballot. Fraud seems more difficult to organize. In reality it 
just takes another form.
A recent study shows that, on DRE voting machines, most of the voters do not review screens at the 
end  of  the  voting  process  and  that  they  fail  to  detect  malicious  changes  [Everett  2007].  This 
behaviour should be borne in mind when reviewing printed ballot paper. A machine which would 
sometimes present a ballot paper with malicious changes would be difficult to detect: most of the 
people would not notice the changes or, if they notice it, may think that they have made an error due 
to inattentiveness rather than conceive that the machine has made an error, and will cast their vote 
again, the machine would not attempt to cheat the same voter twice, so the rare voters who does 
notice an attempt to falsify the vote will probably not be believed
Discrepancies and fraud in counting can be detected only by the verification of the ballot boxes. 
Thus, the storage of the ballot boxes is crucial: any ballot tampering would be a major security flaw 
because it will raise the possibility that the ballot boxes have been altered to make them fit with the 
official results (coming directly from machines).The European Commission for Democracy through 
Law  recommends  explicitly  that  «Mobile  ballot  boxes  should  only  be  allowed  under  strict 
conditions, avoiding all risks of fraud.» [ComVenice 2002].
The identity of the particular computers which will be used as controls must be kept secret before 
and during the poll in order to avoid "easter egg" fraud.
12 This kind of functionality of a program, realeased by a secret sequence of interactions between the computer and a 
user is known as an “easter egg”.
There must be no legal limits placed upon the processes which are involved in counting ballots 
contained in ballot boxes. This ensures the election organizer cannot prevent votes in particular 
ballot boxes from being counted. The best place to organize an election fraud would be from within 
the body responsible for organizing the election.
3.4.3 - Kiosk and remote voting
There are many security flaws with remote voting or kiosk voting because they use devices that can 
not be fully controlled: personal computers can be affected by viruses or worms, different attacks 
can affect the server (e.g. denial-of-service attacks) or the connection spoofing (man-in-the-middle) 
[Jefferson 2004]. 
Parallel testing is impossible because votes coming from many kiosks or personal computers are 
stored by a very small numbers of servers.
4. Facts
Many studies did confirm the analysis which is presented below. Currently, the real situation is 
worse than the analysis suggests. 
A few examples:
USA: The analysis of the DRE Diebold Touch Screen Voting Machine proved that these machines 
can be fraudulently modified without leaving any trace. A few minutes are enough to change the 
memory where the voting software is stored. [Open Voting Foundation 2006]
USA: Harri Hursti showed how to change the program of the Diebold optical scan system in a few 
minutes. His fraudulent program behaves as a virus: it  is propagated from machine to machine 
[Hursti 2005]. 
USA: In November 2003 in Boone County, Indiana over 144,000 votes were cast using DRE voting 
computers even though Boone County contains fewer than 19,000 registered voters. And, of those, 
only 5,532 actually voted [Simons 2004].
South Korea: The Interior Ministry designed a VVAT system. In this system voters can verify 
whether the names that are written on its ballot are the ones of the candidates he chose, but it can 
not  check this  information in the encrypted image that figures also on its ballot.  However,  the 
verification procedure will count information stored in this encrypted image which has not been 
checked.  The VVAT concept  is  here  completely misunderstood,  and the  South  Korean system 
should be seen as a DRE system. 
Venezuela: The choice of the VVAT voting computers that have been verified in 2004, and then in 
2006,  has  not  been  transparent.  Although  supposed  to  be  randomly  chosen,  statistical  studies 
demonstrated that verified machines were not representative of the whole [Delfino 2006]. For the 
last elections, 54% of the ballots boxes had been verified but even if the decision procedure has 
been transparent to the European Union Election Observation Mission, its random character has not 
been questioned by the members of this mission [EU EOM 2006].
USA: In November 2007,  in Cuyahoga County, when it had been decided to recount ten races that 
were very close, officials discovered that 20% of the ballot papers were unreadable. They decided 
to  make the  voting  machines  generate  a  replacement  copy that  can  be  counted,  even  if  these 
replacements had not been verified by electors.  
Venezuela: During the 2006 presidential elections, the European Union observation mission noticed 
that voters encounter some problems when using voting machines in half of all the observed polling 
stations, especially amongst older people and in rural areas.
Australia:  The  Australian Capital  Territory estimates  in  an  observation  conducted  on the  2004 
election, that 86% of voters found the electronic voting system easy to use  [Green 2005]. Thus, 
14% did not find it easy to use. This proportion is high. A significant part of these people had to 
vote with assistance,  or  did  not  vote  successfully  as  they intended.  In  researching  a  high-tech 
solution  the  ACT considered  the  replacement  of  a  keypad with  a  touch-screen,  forgetting  that 
keypads are accessible to blind, while touch-screens are not.
USA:  the  Usability  Professionals'  Association  highlighted  several  usability  problems  with 
electronic  voting  including  cases  of  miscounts  by  optical  scans,  and  various  other  technical 
difficulties [UPA 2004].
Estonia: Since 2003, people had been able to remote vote via Internet. During the 2006 elections in 
Estonia some vote-buying incidents became public [Maaten 2006].
This list is far from being complete.
5. Assessment
We must make a comparison between electronic voting systems and traditional voting systems. 
5.1 - Transparency and fraud
Transparency still remains a problem for electronic voting. 
DRE systems are completely opaque. These electronic systems are vulnerable to large-scale fraud 
which may be undetected due to their characteristics. Of course, some fraud occurs in traditional 
voting systems using paper ballots, but it is unlikely to be both massive and invisible. In traditional 
voting systems large-scale fraud is difficult to organize because too many people would be required 
and it could be more easily reported by witnesses who would be more likely to be aware of the 
fraud’s existence and extent. 
The transformation of DRE to VVAT by adding a printer is an attempt to enhance electronic voting 
system transparency, but our analysis shows that even when a system is fully verifiable, this does 
not necessarily mean that the verification process has taken place or will take place.This solution 
results in a voting system that may give results even when the verification process is neglected. A 
massive fraud could then be organized as with DRE.
The transparency of traditional systems with paper ballots can be enhanced by the systematic use of 
transparent urns, and the wider involvement of voters. Voters must have the right to observe or 
participate in counting votes in poll stations (avoiding the ballot move is a major safeguard against 
fraud), and to control the centralization procedure. 
5.2 - Accessibility
Voting  systems’  accessibility  is  poor  and  could  certainly  be  improved.  Traditional  system 
accessibility should be evaluated in specific studies, but we note that many people who are not 
confident with computers, have no problems with paper, envelopes and pens because these objects 
are encountered in every day life. Ballot design should be enhanced to reduce invalid votes.
By comparison electronic voting can not be comfortably used by numbers of voters, especially 
elderly people, blind people, or people who are not confident with computers.
5.3 - Resistance to intimidation
It is crucial to ensure the personal security of voters by avoiding any possibility that a voter may 
leave the poll station with a proof of vote upon which the selection the voter made is registered. 
This protection is assured by the traditional voting system where people must choose in booths, and 
publicly cast their vote. This manner of proceeding should have been kept with electronic voting.
In  addition,  ballots  must  be  carefully  designed,  especially  if  Australian  ballots13 are  used.  The 
ballots must not display too many choices in order to avoid a common fraud: if there are many 
possible  combinations  of  choices,  each  voter  can  be  forced  to  select  a  particular,  unique 
13 This ballot type is named after its country of origin. On Australian ballots, the names of all-competing parties and 
candidates are grouped on a single sheet of paper, to be marked by the voter.
combination. If the voter decides to disobey the chances may be minimal that the selection which he 
was forced to make, will be made by chance by another voter, so his disobedience would be easily 
noticed.
6. Conclusion
After presenting some features of genuine elections, we described various types of electronic voting 
systems. We exposed the qualities and defaults of these different electronic voting systems with 
regard to transparency, accessibility, resistance to intimidation and resistance to frauds.
Our analysis demonstrates that traditional voting systems which use no electronic counting systems 
compare  favourably  to  electronic  voting  systems  when  transparency  is  taken  into  account, 
transparency  being  a  crucial  factor  in  creating  voter  confidence  in  the  voting  system,  and  in 
consequence, in that of the elected representative’s legitimacy. 
Traditional voting systems are designed to be transparent and can be made extremely resistant to 
attempts to perpetrate large-scale fraud. Because there is no electronic counting aid, a guarantee can 
be given that every ballot will be manually counted, which, according to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, is the best procedure. 
In contrast, all existing electronic voting systems appear to be designed with the capacity to hide 
large fraud which may they take place before polling day and which may be undetected. Errors 
could also remain undetected. Even the VVAT systems can not guarantee that each ballot paper be 
effectively counted. 
In  addition electronic  voting  systems  would  appear  to  deny the  right  to  vote  in  privacy to  an 
important proportion of the electorate. It has also been shown that they facilitate intimidation and 
bribery, and fail to protect individuals.
As  long  as  these  major  defects  are  not  be  repaired,  electronic  voting  should  not  be  used  for 
democratic elections. It would be conceivable to take advantage of the computer’s great potential 
(accuracy, speed) after research has led to some major improvements with regard to the following 
difficult questions which have not yet been adequately answered: Is it possible to conceive of a 
computer-human interface usable by everybody without any assistance? Could an electronic voting 
system be devised which enabled observation of  the computer’s  operation and yet allowed the 
principle of the secret  ballot  to be maintained? It  is  time now to fund major research in these 
exciting fields.
The use of electronic tools, and especially internet communication, has a great potential to enhance 
participation when considering information processing, communication and transaction. But it must 
be understood that voting cannot be considered as a common communication process because of 
special constraints: secrecy, anonymity, transparency, the need to check results and attempted fraud 
constitute a new paradigm that do not exist in any other activity. Quite apart from computers in a 
polling  station,  democratic  voting is  clearly  incompatible  with  the  internet  for  the  moment  (in 
addition, security problem are far from being solved [Schryen 2004], [Madise 2006]). Here again, 
new research projects which encompass scientific, ethical and sociological aspects are essential. 
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